Introduction
A platonist in mathematics believes that arithmetic has a subject matter, i.e., that the statements of arithmetic are about certain objects -the natural numbers. For a platonist, the language of (first-order) arithmetic L a is referential and he is licensed to speak of true and false sentences of L a and to endorse Tarski's analysis of truth. It follows from this Tarskian analysis plus the fact that every natural number is denoted by some closed term of L a (a numeral, if one insists on canonicity) that the truth values of arithmetical sentences are determined by the truth values of its atomic sentences. Consider now a philosopher who, while not a platonist in any sense, broadly accepts the results of mathematics -however tentatively -and is persuaded that the truths of arithmetic are determined by the truth values of its atomic sentences (whatever may be his reformulation of the notion of arithmetical truth). This article may be viewed as an attempt to frame a position for such a non-platonist philosopher of a non-revisionist bent.
It is well known that certain atomic sentences of arithmetic have a persuasive rendering in terms of schemata of formulas of first-order languages with equality. This rendering is specially persuasive insofar as we focus on the cardinal role of numbers (and leave their ordinal role aside). For instance, the sentence 7+5 =12 can be rendered as
xB(x) ∧ ¬∃x(A(x) ∧ B(x)) → ∃ 12 x(A(x) ∨ B(x))
where A and B are any formulas of a given first-order language and where, for each numeral n, ∃ n xC(x) makes the numerical claim that there are exactly n objects x such that C(x). Such numerical claims have straightforward renderings in first-order languages with equality and, thus, expressions of the form ∃ n x C(x) are explicitly eliminable within those languages. I call a first-order scheme like ( * ) a checking point of arithmetic. In the next section, I introduce a number of checking points of arithmetic, sufficient to determine arithmetical truth (in the platonic sense above). This is done in such a manner that an atomic (or negated atomic, as we will see) sentence of arithmetic is true if, and only if, the corresponding scheme consists of logically valid formulas. This feature should be enough to convince our non-revisionist philosopher that arithmetical truth (better, his reformulation thereof) is determined by logic alone. In section 3, I show how to extend the above correspondence to all sentences of first-order arithmetic. My proposal has the following general features. Given a referential first-order language with equality L enhanced with numerical quantifiers of the form ∃ n x, I firstly extend L to a language L sa in which substitutional quantification is permitted for the substitutional class constituted by the numerals n occurring in the expressions ∃ n x (note that the numerals here are construed as syncategorematic, significant in context but naming nothing). Afterwards, I show how to associate with each first-order sentence S of the language of arithmetic L a a scheme of sentences S of the substitutional language L sa such that if S is true then each instance of S is logically valid. A suitable modification of the converse of this implication also holds. Hence, under this rendering, arithmetical truth is subsumed under a notion of logical validity and the nature of the determination of arithmetic by its checking points is rooted in substitutional quantification. I therefore accomplish a form of reduction of arithmetic to logic, a brand of logicism for first-order arithmetic. In the last section, I compare my substitutional approach with Gottlieb's approach as presented in [Got80] . I do not attempt to discuss the ontological issues posed by substitutional quantification. They are too intricate to be discussed in this paper. All the same, I finish the paper with an observation concerning the so-called orthodox interpretation of my substitutional apparatus.
Checking points of arithmetic
My insisting that the checking points of arithmetic are schemata of first-order formulas poses some difficulties concerning the proper treatment of the operation of negation. For instance, given natural numbers n, k and r, I render the atomic sentence n + k = r of referential number theory by the scheme,
It is clear that this scheme consists of logically valid sentences if, and only if, n+k = r. Consider now the falsity 5 + 3 = 7. How should its negation, viz. 5 + 3 = 7, be rendered? Gottlieb in [Got80] does not have to face this problem since he renders 5 + 3 = 7 by the second-order sentence,
Accordingly, Gottlieb renders 5 + 3 = 7 by,
This rendering is problematic. In a universe with less than eight elements 5+3 = 7 is rendered true, while 5 + 3 = 7 is rendered false. A curious inversion of truthvalues. Gottlieb welcomes the first type of situations in which, due to the finiteness of the universe, certain falsities of arithmetic are rendered true. He adds that that 'is precisely what is to be expected if we found our account of arithmetic upon its application to multiplicity attributions.' 2 I agree with Gottlieb's remark but I add a correctness constraint: in a proper account of arithmetic, the truths of arithmetic should yield truths in applications to objectual languages. In this light, the fact that some falsities of arithmetic may -in certain situations -yield truths is beside the point. Gottlieb could not have subscribed to this constraint because, in his framework, the negations of the above falsities (which are bona fide arithmetical truths) would, in the very same situations, yield falsities. That is what happens with his rendering of 5 + 3 = 7. Gottlieb rightly sees a problem here and he proposes a revision of the axioms of arithmetic. I resist revisionism. Therefore, I deal with this problem differently.
Given numerals n, k and r, I render the atomic sentence n + k = r of referential number theory by the scheme,
Each pair of corresponding instances of the schematic renderings of n + k = r and n + k = r is constituted by subcontrary sentences, i.e., by two sentences that cannot be both false but which can be both true. As a matter of fact, there are situations in which all the instances of both schemes n + k = r and n + k = r are true. This seems to be a fatal blow for a proper treatment of the non-atomic sentences of arithmetic, namely for a proper treatment of true arithmetic sentences of the form ¬(n + k = r ∧ n + k = r). However, the no go situation is apparent. The heart of the solution to this problem will be presented in the following paragraphs and, in the next section, a mathematical theorem will dispel any remaining doubts concerning the soundness of my solution.
It is convenient to work with a language L a of first-order arithmetic which has no function symbols and which has a constant symbol c n for each natural number n. This treatment of negation for classical logic is well-known (see [Tai68] ). Note that ¬¬A is the same formula as A. As usual, we define A → B to be ¬A ∨ B and A ↔ B to be (A → B) ∧ (B → A). According to this set-up, the sentence ¬(n + k = r ∧ n + k = r) is firstly rendered as ¬(Add(n, k, r) ∧ Add(n, k, r)) and finally takes the official form Add(n, k, r) ∨ Add(n, k, r). Now, if we translate Add and Add according to (1) and (2) above and if we suitably conjoin these schemes, the true sentence ¬(n + k = r ∧ n + k = r) is rendered by the first-order scheme,
Observe that the instances of the above scheme are logically valid, no matter what are the numerals n, k and r. This is as it should be.
We finish this section with a catalog of the checking points of arithmetic, one for each atomic sentence of L a . As we go along, the reader should pause and convince himself that each checking point is constituted by logically valid sentences if, and only if, the corresponding arithmetical sentence is true in the standard interpretation of L a . We have already discussed the checking points of arithmetic associated with the sentences of the form Add(n, k, r) and Add(n, k, r). These are the schemata (1) and (2), respectively. There remains the following cases:
(3) The checking point of n = k is the scheme:
(4) The checking point of n = k is the scheme:
(5) The checking point of Suc(n, k) is the scheme:
(6) The checking point of Suc(n, k) is the scheme:
(7) The checking point of Mul(n, k, r) is the scheme:
(8) Finally, the checking point of Mul(n, k, r) is the scheme:
Let me give an application of (7). Suppose A(x) means that x is a soccer team in the Portuguese upper division soccer championship league. Suppose C(x, y) means that y is a soccer player of team x at the start of a given complete round of soccer matches. There are 18 soccer teams in the championship league and each team starts a match with 11 players (it goes without saying that a soccer player cannot play for two teams simultaneously). By a logically valid instance of (7), we can conclude that there are 198 soccer players at the start of the given complete round of soccer matches.
Substitutional arithmetic done right (?)
Let L be a first-order referential language enhanced with numerical quantifiers of the form ∃ n x. I extend L to a language L sa in which substitutional quantification plays a prominent role. With slight differences of terminology, I essentially follow the paradigmatic treatment of substitutional quantification as expounded by Kripke in [Kri76] . Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . be an infinite list of variables not occurring in L. (Following Kripke's notation, I use italicized variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . for the referential variables of the given language L; the new unitalicized variables play a substitutional role in the extended language L sa .) An atomic form is an expression obtained from a sentence of L by replacing zero or more numerals n occurring in the context of a numerical quantifier ∃ n x by an unitalicized variable. For instance, given A(x) a formula of L with parameters z 1 , . . ., z s , then
is an atomic form with free substitutional variables x and y (the prefix ∀z 1 · · · ∀z s ensures that the above atomic form comes from a sentence of L). We are now ready to define inductively the notion of a form of L sa . An atomic form is a form. If φ and ψ are forms then so are φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, Σxφ and Πxφ. (It is assumed that the truthfunctions and the existential Σ and the universal Π substitutional quantifiers are new notations, not to be found in L.) A sentence form of L sa is a form without free substitutional variables (note that, by definition, forms do not have free referential variables). Ever since Tarski [Tar83] , we know how to define truth for sentences of L with respect to a previously given interpretation. We extend Tarski's truth conditions to account for the notion of a true sentence form of L sa . The conditions are:
(a) If φ is an atomic form which is a sentence (thus φ is a sentence of L), then φ is true in the extended sense if, and only if, it is true in the original sense.
(b) φ ∨ ψ is true if, and only if, either φ is true or ψ is true (or both).
(c) φ ∧ ψ is true if, and only if, both φ and ψ are true.
(d) Σxφ is true if, and only if, there is a numeral n such that φ is true, where φ comes from φ by replacing all free occurrences of x by n.
(e) Πxφ is true if, and only if, for all numerals n, φ is true, where φ comes from φ by replacing all free occurrences of x by n.
For instance, according to the above definition, the scheme of sentence forms
is always true, no matter what is the given interpretation of the underlying referential language L (as before, z 1 , . . ., z s are the parameters of A(x)). Let L a be the language of first-order arithmetic, as described in the last section. I define a correspondence between formulas S of L a and schemata of forms S of L sa . The correspondence is such that if x, y, z (say) are the free variables of S, then x, y, z are the free substitutional variables of the forms occurring in S. The correspondence is defined inductively, according to the following clauses:
(a) If S is an atomic sentence of L a , then S consists of the first-order referential universal closures of the formulas of the corresponding checking points (i.e., the checking points are prefixed by a row of universal objectual quantifiers ∀z 1 · · · ∀z s to ensure that all referential variables are bound). The case of atomic formulas is obtained from the previous case by suitably replacing numerals in the numerical quantifiers by substitutional variables. E.g., the scheme that corresponds to Add(3, z, x), consists of the universal referential closures of
(b) The scheme corresponding to Q 1 ∨ Q 2 consists of the forms φ ∨ ψ, where φ is in the scheme corresponding to Q 1 and ψ is in the scheme corresponding to Q 2 .
(c) The scheme corresponding to Q 1 ∧ Q 2 consists of the forms φ ∧ ψ, where φ is in the scheme corresponding to Q 1 and ψ is in the scheme corresponding to Q 2 .
(d) The scheme corresponding to ∃xQ consists of the forms Σxφ, where φ is in the scheme corresponding to Q.
(e) The scheme corresponding to ∀xQ consists of the forms Πxφ, where φ is in the scheme corresponding to Q.
We are now ready to state and prove the following theorem:
Theorem. If S is a true sentence of L a , then the corresponding scheme S consists of true sentence forms of L sa .
Proof : This is a simple proof by induction on the complexity of the sentence S. If S is a true atomic sentence, a direct inspection of the checking points (1) -(8) of the last section shows that the corresponding scheme indeed consists of true sentence forms. Suppose S is the disjunction S 1 ∨ S 2 . Then either S 1 is true or S 2 is true. Assume, without loss of generality, the earlier case. By definition, the scheme corresponding to S consists of the sentence forms φ ∨ ψ, where φ is in the scheme corresponding to S 1 and ψ is in the scheme corresponding to S 2 . By induction hypothesis, the above φs are true. Therefore, so are the disjunctions φ∨ψ. Now, suppose S is ∃xQ(x). Then there is a numeral n such that Q(n) is true. By definition, the scheme S corresponding to S consists of the forms Σxφ(x), where φ(x) is in the scheme corresponding to the formula Q(x). By induction hypothesis, φ(n) is a true sentence form for every such form φ. Hence, Σxφ(x) is true. The cases of conjunction and universal quantifications are also easy to handle. Q. E. D.
In the above theorem, it is implicit a given interpretation of the original referential language L (from which L sa is built). This interpretation can be any interpretation. Therefore, in a definite sense, if S is a true sentence of number theory, then S consists of logically valid sentence forms. 4 In fact, more is true. A scheme of logically valid sentence forms of the type Σxφ(x) -where φ(x) is a form in a previously given scheme S -is called robust if there is a numeral n such that all sentence forms φ(n) -where φ(x) is in S -are logically valid. It is a consequence of the proof of the above theorem that if ∃xQ(x) is a true sentence of arithmetic, then the corresponding logically valid scheme is robust.
5 This property of robustness is crucial for a correct rendering of arithmetical truth. It says, in effect, that the substitutions that make each instance of a scheme -corresponding to a true arithmetical sentence -a true sentence form are independent from the particular instance in question. If we were working with slightly more logical resources, we could have expressed the above mentioned independence in a direct linguistic (as opposed to a meta-linguistic) way. Indeed, if we allow quantification for the predicates of the underlying referential language, then we could associate with each sentence S of arithmetic a sentence S of the expanded language L sa by replacing the checking points of arithmetic with a corresponding universal predicate closure. For instance, the arithmetical statement ∀x∃y Suc(x, y) would be rendered by
6,7
Although the alternative account uses a new sort of quantification, it nevertheless seems committed to the same ontology as the original account. In fact, the new predicate quantifiers are always universal and never appear in subordinate clauses. Predicative expressions (or predicates, or classes, or whatever) are required for making the (alternative) rendering of true arithmetical sentences logically valid schemata, as much as they are required to account for the schematic validities of first-order logic.
8 And nothing is required for the latter account, as Quine forcefully argues in [Qui53] . The reason why I did not pursue the alternative account is that I wanted to press to the limits a minimal use of logical resources. But have I pressed too much? Is my account at all faithful to the fabric of arithmetic? To put it more exactly: are the truths of arithmetic determined by the checking points of arithmetic plus logical validity plus my minimal substitutional apparatus? The answer to this question is affirmative. That is the content of the next theorem, which applies to sufficiently rich underlying referential languages:
Theorem. If S is a false sentence of L a , then the corresponding scheme S is not constituted only by logically valid sentence forms.
A proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
Final remarks
We can read the sentences of the language L a of first-order arithmetic as encapsulations of certain schemata derived from first-order referential languages. The common ground between these schemata and referential first-order languages are the checking points of arithmetic. These checking points make claims about multiplicity attributions and it is upon these claims that arithmetic is ultimately founded and that its applications are accounted for. As we saw, these schemata are logically valid if, and only if, the (assumed) underlying arithmetical sentence is true. Insofar as arithmetical truth is subsumed under a notion of logical validity, we may classify the above rendering as a brand of logicism, albeit of a non-Fregean type since it is not framed on second-order logic nor does it regard numbers as objects via Hume's principle. The deductive calculus of first-order arithmetic can be seen as a calculus for producing (certain) logically valid schemata. Even though this calculus is formally consonant with a direct referential reading, its semantics is in no way directly referential. For instance, the semantic interpretation of the negation sign cannot, in any sense, be considered negation. A similar phenomenon concerns the behaviour of the equality sign: formally, it is like equality in a referential language. In actual fact, it does not even stand for a relation between objects.
My rendering of arithmetic and Gottlieb's account in [Got80] are founded on the same two fundamental ideas: application to multiplicity attributions and substitutional quantification. There is a definite sense in which my proposal is both an amendment and an amelioration of Gottlieb's arithmetic. On the one hand, it is an amendment because Gottlieb's arithmetic does not satisfy the correctness constraint. On Gottlieb's account, there are true sentences of arithmetic (even quantifier-free) which are rendered false in certain circunstances. I have already given an example of this phenomenon in section 2, but it is worthwhile to point out that Gottlieb's problem already shows up at the really fundamental level of the interpretation of inequality. According to Gottlieb, given a certain referential language and a certain interpretation thereof, the sentence n = k is true if, and only if, it is not the case that ∀F (∃ n xF x ↔ ∃ k xF x). On this account, if the domain of the interpretation has less than k elements, then n = k is rendered false for all n > k. Gottlieb's way out is to revise arithmetic, thus dissenting from the correctness constraint. On the other hand, my proposal ameliorates Gottlieb's account in that it is more parsimonious in the use of logical and semantic resources. As I have already remarked, Gottlieb makes use of substitutional quantification not only for the numerals occurring in expressions of the form ∃ n x, but also for the predicates of the given referential language. Moreover, Gottlieb introduces the truth conditions for multiplication via a recursive definition that reduces these conditions to the truth conditions of addition. Only a somewhat indirect reading of these truth conditions for multiplication would understand them in terms of multiplicity attributions. My approach to multiplication is not mediated by addition, does not use the apparatus of a recursive definition for the truth-conditions, and has a direct reading in terms of multiplicity attributions.
Quine's criterium of ontological commitment for an objectual first-order language states that some given object is required in a theory if that object is required, for the truth of the theory, to be among the values over which the bound variables range (see [Qui69] ). Orthodox wisdom complements this criterium with the following principle: when the language of a theory is not objectual, then the ontological commitments of the theory cannot be assessed directly -the language must be first translated into an objectual first-order language and only then can the commitment be assessed. In the case of substitutional quantification, Quine proposes a translation which is mathematically indistinguishable from the truth theory given in the first paragraphs of the previous section. It follows that a theory framed in a substitutional language is, in general, committed to an ontology of expressions and of (finite) sequences of objects. Substitutionalism, on the other hand, is the doctrine according to which substitutional quantification carries no ontological commitments. A substitutionalist rejects orthodoxy and, accordingly, feels entitled to reject abstracta like expressions. A third view, proposed by Parsons in [Par83] , maintains that substitutional quantifications 'could express a genuine concept of existence, different from that of the objectual quantifier.'
9 The question of adjudicating between orthodoxy, substitutionalism or Parsons's middle way is an intricate ontological question whose discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
All the same, I would like to draw attention to a feature of the substitutional framework for arithmetical validity presented in this article. According to this interpretation, sentences of first-order arithmetic are read as encapsulations of certain schemata derived from first-order languages. I showed in the previous section that if a sentence of first-order arithmetic is true in the standard interpretation of number theory then that sentence encapsulates (robust) logically valid schemata. As a consequence, the correctness constraint is uphold. There is, of course, an alternative substitutional interpretation of first-order arithmetic which assents to the correctness constraint. Such an interpretation is based on algorithms that discriminate the truths from the falsehoods for atomic sentences of first-order arithmetic. Quantifications are then interpreted substitutionally, i.e., a sentence of the form ∃xQ(x) is true if, and only if, there is some closed term t of the language of arithmetic such that Q(t) is true. In my view, this interpretation has a limited philosophical interest unless it is complemented by an account regarding the applications of arithmetic (Parsons sketches such an account in pp. 416-417 of [Par82] ). However, this "combinatorial" interpretation and my interpretation are altogether different, even with respect to the ontological commitments to numerals under an orthodox analysis. Let us see why.
On the orthodox interpretation, the "combinatorial" view is ontologically committed to all numerals. However, this need not be the case for the substitutional interpretation presented in this article. In fact, if the domain of the underlying language L is finite -say, of cardinality n -then, on the orthodox interpretation, my framework is only ontologically committed to the first n + 2 numerals.
10 This can be seen as follows. Given any form φ(x, y) associated with a given atomic formula Q(x, y) (say) of L a , and given natural numbers k and r, φ(k, r) is a true sentence form if, and only if, φ(min{k, n + 1}, min{r, n + 1}) is.
11 We can see this by direct inspection. Plainly, this phenomenon propagates to all first-order formulas of arithmetic.
On the surface, there is something bizarre in the above result. If we start with a singleton universe, then every sentence of referential arithmetic is translated into a schema that can be decided with only three numerals. This seems to fly in the face of results of Church, Gödel, Tarski et al. to the effect that the set of truths of number theory is not decidable. In fact, the contradiction is apparent. My set-up does not entail that a falsity of arithmetic is translated into a scheme constituted by false sentences. It just entails that a truth of arithmetic is translated into a scheme constituted by true sentences. The injunction is: use true sentences of arithmetic in your study of the world, not false ones.
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Appendix
Let L be a first-order language with equality with at least two binary relation sym- bols A(x, u) and B(x, v) and a ternary relation symbol C(x, y, w) . We associate with each formula S of the language L a of arithmetic a special form F S of the scheme S of forms corresponding to S. This is done as follows:
(a) If S is an atomic sentence of L a , e.g. n + k = r, then F S is the sentence form
∀u∀v(∃ n xA(x, u)∧∃ k xB(x, v)∧¬∃x(A(x, u)∧B(x, v)) → ∃ r x(A(x, u)∨B(x, v))).
Similarly for the other atomic sentences of arithmetic (the notation is setup in such a way as to make obvious what are the special forms associated with each atomic sentence). The case of atomic formulas is obtained from the previous case by suitably replacing numerals in the numerical quantifiers by substitutional variables. Given an atomic sentence of arithmetic S, it is clear that S is true if, and only if, F S is true in M. It is straightforward to argue that this equivalence propagates to all first-order sentences of arithmetic. Q. E. D.
